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Effect of Publicly Released Quality Information 
for US Hard Red Winter Wheat on Mexican Millers’ Welfare 
 
Growth in domestic demand has caused Mexico to increase its dependence on wheat imports.  
The United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization reports that Mexican wheat imports 
increased over 800% in 15 years, from 442,800 MT in 1990 to 4,066,500 MT in 2005 (FAO 
2007).  A factor contributing to the increase in wheat imports is the disparity between the type of 
wheat that is primarily produced in Mexico and the type of wheat demanded by consumers.  
Mexico’s primarily produces durum-type wheat which is used to make noodles and pasta.  By 
contrast, most of the wheat imported and used by domestic consumers is hard wheat suitable for 
making bakery products.  For example, from 2000 to 2006, durum wheat accounted for about 
91% of all wheat produced in Mexico (SAGARPA 2007).   
  The growth in demand for hard wheat in Mexico has been beneficial for U.S. wheat 
producers.  Mexico is the third largest wheat importer of U.S. wheat, ranked after Egypt and 
Japan and is the largest single-country buyer of U.S. hard red winter wheat produced in the U.S. 
Southern Plains.  Canada is the largest competitor in supplying wheat to Mexico.  From 1997-
2007, Mexico imported 24,525,756 MT of wheat from the U.S. and 10,206,818 MT from Canada 
(FAS/USDA 2007, Statistics Canada 2007).  The U.S. has a geographic advantage over Canada, 
being able to offer more competitive prices given lower transportation costs.  Additionally, 
Mexican millers prefer rail to ocean-vessel transportation, and the well-established rail system 
between U.S. and Mexico favors U.S. exports (Gallardo, 2007).   
Despite the transportation advantages the U.S. maintains over Canada in serving the 
Mexican market, Canadian wheat exhibits consistent quality, primarily as a result of a strong 
export regulatory board (Lavoie 2005; Mejía and Rosales 2004).  Indeed, U.S. wheat quality has   3 
been questioned for over two decades.  Mexican milling companies’ concern is the lack of 
consistency in U.S. wheat quality and that the quality of wheat received does not always coincide 
with the quality specifications prior to shipment (Gallardo, 2007).  The information supplied by 
the current U.S. wheat quality grades are primarily based on physical characteristics including 
test weight, damaged, shrunken, and broken kernels, foreign material, and total defects.  This 
information provides little or no information about end-use (baking) characteristics, which is of 
interest to the millers striving to meet clients’ requirements (Lyford et al. 2004).   
These observations have prompted some U.S. wheat exporters to argue that selling wheat 
based solely on current grades and standards is insufficient.  Changing the existing standards is 
likely cost prohibitive (Mercier 1993) and it is likely to be inefficient to information on end-use 
quality characteristics for transaction made in the market.  An alternative that has been proposed 
to improve the supply of information is to identify more detailed information on wheat quality 
characteristics by U.S. region and provide this information to foreign buyers.     
To address these perceived informational gaps in the system, non-profit organizations 
have been created, e.g., the Wheat Marketing Center in Portland, OR and Plain Grains Inc. (PGI) 
in Stillwater, OK.  PGI is an organization created in 2004 to assist producers, millers, and bakers 
by providing geographically-based quality information for each year’s hard red winter wheat 
crop.  They facilitate sampling and quality testing of hard red winter wheat from the production 
area of Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, South Dakota, and Montana.  The 
disaggregated regional information is published for every crop year on both the PGI and the U.S. 
Wheat Associates websites.  In addition, PGI conducts educational workshops on grain quality 
and the baking process, and PGI personnel travel to Mexico to promote the quality findings 
directly to Mexican millers (Regnier and Holcomb 2004).        4 
An open question is the whether there is any value to the information being disseminated 
by organizations such as PGI.  In this study, we model the effect of the increased accessibility to 
wheat quality information provided by PGI on Mexican milling companies’ welfare.  PGI 
marketing expenditures are as a proxy for access to information, and this variable is included in 
an estimation of a system of equations including the Mexican millers’ cost function and source-
differentiated factor demands.  By investigating how Mexican millers’ costs change as 
accessibility to information changes, we are able to calculate the value of information provision. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
In this paper, we built this study on the seminal papers by Foster and Just (1998) and Teisl, 
Bockstael, and Levy (2001) related to the value of information.  These previous studies estimated 
the effect of information related to milk contamination and nutritional information on 
consumers’ welfare.  In this study, we move from the consumer to the firm and apply the 
approach taken by Foster and Just (1998) and Teisl, Bockstael, and Levy (2001) to the firms’ 
cost function.  Wheat is treated as an input in the production of flour and, following studies such 
as Marsh et al. (2005), Koo, Mao, and Sakurai (2001), and Lavoie (2005), we treat wheat from 
various countries as separate, source-differentiated inputs in the production process.    
Mexican milling companies’ are assumed to minimize cost, as given by: 
(1)  ) , , ( min q w x C C
x
=  subject to  ) (x f y =           
where C is the cost function, x represents the vector of inputs, w represents the vector of input 
prices, y is the output level, and  q is the quality of input x.  As in Foster and Just (1998), quality 
is assumed to be uncertain and its probability distribution is described by the parametersq . 
Millers choosing x to minimize equation (1), resulting in the optimal input quantities, x*.    5 
Substituting these optimal input quantities back into equation (1) yields the indirect cost function 
given by  ) , , ( q Y w C  where Y is the optimal output required to minimize cost.   
Now, assume there is a change in input quality from 0 q  to 1 q , where in our case  1 q  may 
be higher or lower than  0 q  depending on the conditions of the crop-year.  If firms have perfect 
information, they are fully aware of the quality change, and welfare gains are captured by the 
difference between the firms’ minimum costs associated with qualities 0 q and 1 q .  In other words, 
if firms have perfect information, they will be able to adjust their use of input from x0 to x1 when 
quality changes from  0 q  to 1 q .  In this case, the change in welfare resulting from the quality 
change is represented by the compensating variation (CV): 
(2)  ) , , ( ) , , ( 0 0 0 1 0 0 q q Y w C Y w C CV - =  
What if firms are not informed about the change in input quality?  If firms are unaware of 
the change in quality of x, they will not modify their input use appropriately.  That is, the firms 
continue to use input quantities which are now sub-optimal given the (unknown to the firm) 
change in quality.  Foster and Just (1998) referred to this inefficiency as the cost of ignorance, 
which is a measure of the welfare effect of changing quality under imperfect information.  When 
firms are unaware of a quality change, they experienced higher or lower welfare than in (2) 
depending on the nature of the change in quality.  The welfare gain/loss of the uninformed firms 
is given by the compensating surplus (CS) measure: 
(3)  ) , , ( ) ; , , (
~
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 q q Y w C x Y w C CS - =  
where  ) ; , , (
~
0 1 0 0 x Y w C q represents the cost where x is constrained to be at the level that would be 
optimal if no change in quality had occurred.   The cost of ignorance (or the value of 
information) is given by the difference between (2) and (3).   6 
(4)  ) ,￿ Y , C(w ) ;x ,￿ Y , (w C CV CS COI 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
~
- = - =    
By construction, cost of ignorance (COI) is negative:  If the change in quality is positive, the 
gains in CS would be smaller than CV.  If the change is negative, the losses in CV would be 
greater than CS.   
  To facilitate the estimation of COI, we follow Foster and Just (1998) and defined a vector 
of input prices, 1 w , associated with the quality distribution 1 q .  Before the quality change, there is 
an initial level of input prices, output quantity, and input quality ) , , ( 0 0 0 q Y w .  If there is a change 
in input quality from  0 q to 1 q  , then 1 w  would be the price for 0 x , the initial level of input use.  
The difference between 0 w and 1 w  is the difference in input prices required to induce firms to 
purchase 0 x .  Hence, CS can be alternatively represented by: 
(5)  [ ] [ ] 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 ) ( ) , , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( x w w Y w C Y w C x w Y w C x w Y w C CS - + - = - - - = q q q q  
Consequently, the cost of ignorance can be re-written as: 
(6)  ) , , ( ) ( ) , , ( 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 q q Y w C x w w Y w C CV CS COI - - + = - =    
As 0 w approaches 1 w , the cost of ignorance approaches to zero. 
  Firms might possess an initial and, likely imperfect assessment of the quality of an input.  
The subjective distribution of the input quality assessment is given by 0 q .  Information provided 
by a wheat marketing organization such as PGI allows millers to update their assessments.  The 
new subjective distribution is given by 1 q , and it is at least as accurate as or more so than the 
initial assessment.  If milling companies are prevented from receiving the information, or PGI 
stops operations, millers’ cost of ignorance is represented by expression (6).  Likewise the value 
of information is from PGI is -1*COI.   




The empirical model is based on the approach used by Marsh (2005) and Koo, Mao, and Sakurai 
(2001).  There are two groups of inputs in flour production: wheat and other inputs such as labor, 
capital, and energy.  A milling company’s objective function is represented by:  
(7)  )) , , ( ), , , ( ( ) , , , , ( min 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1
, 2 1
q q q w x C w x C C w w x x C C
x x
= =    
where C represents the cost function, x1 is the vector of wheat types (US, Canadian, and Mexican 
wheat), x2 is the vector for other inputs (labor, capital, and energy), w1 is a vector of wheat prices 
corresponding to the prices of US, Canadian, and Mexican wheat, and w2 is a price vector for 
other inputs.  Following Marsh (2005), we assume weak separability in the cost function, which 
allows us to focus specifically on the function C1.  In addition, we assume firms are homogenous 
(i.e. face the same input prices, use same levels of inputs, and produce the same level of output) 
and that different flour types can be aggregated into a weighted average flour output quantity: 




m sy Y    
where Y  is the aggregated flour quantity; s is the quantity of flour type m produced, with m= 
soft, semi-fine, fine, extra-fine; and ym is the flour type m quantity.  These assumptions imply 
that the firm’s indirect cost function can be written as:  ) , , ( 1 q Y w C  
  To model milling companies cost function, we utilize the normalized quadratic function, 
which represents a second order approximation to the true indirect cost function,  ) , , ( 1 q Y w C .  In 
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where Costn  is the indirect cost function normalized with respect to Mexican wheat prices,  0 a  
is the intercept,  t y is the aggregated flour output produced in Mexico, 
*
1 w  and 
*
2 w  are the prices 
of U.S. and Canadian wheat normalized by Mexican wheat prices, T is the time trend to take into 
consideration effects of technology, productivity, and other factors over time,  1 q  is the function 
of the expenditures of U.S. non-profit wheat marketing companies, QDis the indicator variable 
for quarter included to take into consideration seasonality in Mexican wheat imports. 
  To model the effect of information availability, we used an approach similar to that in 
Piggott et al. (1996).  They measured the effect of advertising expenditures on Australian meat 
demand.  In this study, wheat marketing expenditures are used as a proxy to model Mexican 
milling companies’ access to wheat quality information.  Expenditures include the travel costs 
for PGI to visit Mexican milling companies and also include costs of PGI website development 
and maintenance costs where wheat quality information is published.  We model expenditures as 
an input demand shifter.  The effect of such information expenditures are likely to persist over 
time, meaning that current wheat purchases respond to information expenditures in previous 
periods.  In general, we specify the information parameter associated with US wheat quality as: 
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where  0 q  is an intercept term, PGItt represents PGI travel expenditures during time t, PGIwt are 
expenditures on website development and maintenance in time t, and b 4k and b 5k are the 
parameters representing the effect of an additional unit of travel and website expenditures 
respectively, in the current and lagged period k = 0, 1, 2,  . . K.  The appropriate number of lags, 
K, to include is determined by identifying the number of lags which best fit the data.
1
  Imposing symmetry  ji ij w w =  and utilizing Sheppard’s lemma, we obtain the input 
demand functions for US and Canadian Wheat: 
(11)  t US USt USUS CANt USCAN t US US US
US
T w w y x
w
Costn
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  The system of equations (9)-(12) are estimated using seemingly unrelated regression 
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Where  ij b7 is the estimate marginal cost of wheat imported both from the U.S. and Canada, i, j= 
U.S. and Canada,  i w  is the average wheat price, and  ij x is the average quantity of imported 
wheat.  To estimate the Mexican wheat demand elasticity we utilize the homogeneity property 
imposed by the normalization: 
(14)  CAN US MEX e e e - - =  
                                                 
1 We have considered other parametrizations of equation (10).  For example, one specification included a single 
expenditure parameter including both travel and website maintenance.  Another specification assumed information 
expenditures had a cumulative effect over time. Overall, equation (10) appeared to provide the best fit to the data.   
   10 
  To estimate the value of information or cost of ignorance, observations were divided into 
two groups: before October 2004 when PGI started their marketing activities, and after October 
2004.  Subscripts 0 and 1, respectively, correspond to these two time periods.  To calculate the 
compensating variation and compensating surplus, we used the estimated parameters and the 
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To control for variations in cost due to changes in productivity or technology, the output quantity 
and time trend variables were held constant across equations (15) through (17).  Thus, for this 
study the cost of ignorance is the difference between equations (15) and (17).  
 
Data   11 
The study utilizes data on monthly observations of prices and quantities over the period January 
1997 to June 2007.  Because most U.S. wheat exported to Mexico is Hard Red Winter (HRW)
2, 
FOB Gulf prices for U.S. HRW grade 2 were used.  Most Canadian wheat exported to Mexico is 
Canadian Western Red Spring (CWRS), thus FOB Pacific prices for CWRS grade 1 were used.  
Both U.S. and Canadian wheat prices were obtained from the ERS-USDA (2007) reports.  Prices 
were deflated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for both U.S. and Canada.  The indexes 
were obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2007) and Canada’s National Statistical 
Agency (2007), respectively.  Prices for domestically produced Mexican wheat were not 
available on a monthly basis, and as such, they were estimated using the Producer Price Index for 
wheat published by the Bank of Mexico Division of Statistics (2007).  The index measures 
nominal prices received by farmers related to prices observed in December 2003.  Mexican 
prices were converted from pesos into U.S. dollars using nominal exchange rates, and were 
deflated using the Mexican CPI. 
Wheat quantities imported into Mexico from the U.S. were obtained from the Foreign 
Agricultural Service (FAS-USDA 2007).  The quantity of Mexican wheat imported from Canada 
was obtained from Statistics Canada (2007).  For both the U.S. and Canada, we used the 
aggregated wheat imports from each country, excluding durum wheat and seed wheat.  Mexican 
wheat production volumes were obtained from the Agriculture, Food, and Fisheries Information 
Service Division (SIAP 2007).  These quantities represent are aggregated wheat production 
volumes of all wheat types.  About 14% of the wheat produced in Mexico is hard wheat, thus the 
                                                 
2 ERS-USDA (2007) reports that from 1996/97 to 2005/06 62% of all wheat exported to Mexico was HRW. The 
Canadian Grain Commission (2007) reports that for the crop year 2005/06 65% of all wheat exported to Mexico was 
CWRS.   12 
production quantities included in the model were the 14% of total what production reported by 
SIAP. 
Output quantities of flour produced in Mexico were obtained from the National Institute 
of Statistics, Geography, and Informatics (INEGI 2007), and included first and second class 
flour, and wheat milling by-products.  The only other data needed to estimate the model was PGI 
marketing expenditures, which were obtained from PGI (2007), and included both expenditures 




  To determine the appropriate model specification, several tests were conducted.  First,  
Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation was conducted.  The Durbin-Watson tests statistics were 
between the lower and upper bounds critical values, and as such, no effort was made to correct 
for autocorrelation.  Second, to determine the number of lags to include in the information 
equation, likelihood ratio tests were conducted.  Results revealed that three lags were the 
appropriate specification.  
  Price elasticities are reported in table 1.  Results indicate that Canadian wheat demand is 
more elastic than demand for U.S. wheat.  These results are similar to Koo, Mao, and Sakurai 
(2001) findings that Japanese millers were more sensitive to price of high quality wheat classes.  
Note that Mexican wheat demand is more inelastic than U.S. and Canadian, a reasonable 
outcome considering that the typical practice is for milling companies in Mexico to initially 
demand wheat from national producers and then begin importing foreign wheat once domestic 
supplies are exhausted.   13 
  The estimated elasticities are reasonably close to those obtained by Marsh (2005) who 
found that U.S. hard red winter wheat own price elasticity was -0.864.  However, Koo, Mao, and 
Sakurai (2001), in their analysis of Japanese wheat demand, found that U.S. hard wheat own 
price elasticity was -5.860.  This difference might be attributable to intrinsic differences in each 
market.  Note that the cross price elasticity between Canadian and Mexican wheat demand is 
negative; implying that Mexican millers would buy even small quantities of high quality 
Canadian wheat to mix with local wheat or imported U.S. wheat to achieve the quality required. 
  To estimate the value of wheat quality information, we evaluated the estimated cost 
function at input prices and marketing expenditures before and after PGI began operations, as 
depicted in equations (15)-(17).  Results are reported in table 2.  Note that normalized cost before 
PGI started operations ) , , ( 0 0 0 q y w Costn  is higher than the cost at the same time but including PGI 
expenditures in the equation ) , , ( 1 0 0 q y w Costn .  Cost after PGI began operations, ) , , ( 1 0 1 q y w Costn  
is noticeably higher than the two previous cost values.  Compensating variation (CV), surplus 
(CS) and cost of ignorance where estimated following equations (2), (5), and (6); and are 
reported in table 3.  Results showed CV and CS are negative, implying that the released 
information indicated that wheat quality was not as expected.  Recall that CV is the welfare 
change assuming perfect information, and CS is the welfare change when millers are not aware 
of the change in quality.  These findings coincide with our expectations; if millers are unaware of 
the change in quality, they have a greater welfare loss than if they knew about this change.  For 
this specific case, information about U.S. wheat did not reflect the quality Mexican buyers 
expected.  Consequently, expenditures disseminating quality information did not increase U.S. 
wheat exports to Mexico.  However, recognizing that wheat is lower quality than what was 
expected is valuable to Millers.  That is, Mexican millers are better off knowing, in with more   14 
precision the quality of the wheat imported, even if their expectations are not met.  The welfare 
loss for ignoring quality information is $60,790.340.  Alternatively, the value of information 
expenditures to Mexican millers is estimated at $60,790.340 annually.     
Conclusions 
This study used compensating surplus and compensating variation concepts to measure the 
welfare effects for Mexican milling companies of publishing information related to U.S. wheat 
quality.  Because it was not possible to find data to model Mexican millers’ accessibility to 
quality information, we used the expenditures of a non-profit U.S. marketing company whose 
main purpose is to publish quality information and heavily promote this information to the 
Mexican market.  The CV and CS concepts were applied to a normalized cost function. 
  Most parameter estimates for the system of equations were as expected.  For instance, 
own price estimates were negative, flour quantities and time were positive implying that flour 
production increased over time, and time had a negative effect on real costs, suggesting that 
technology and other factors over time improved production efficiency.  Findings showed that 
PGI expenditures had a negative effect on flour production costs and on wheat quantities 
imported from the U.S. for 2004-2007.  These results were consistent with further findings that 
compensating valuation and surplus were negative, indicating that U.S. quality was not as 
Mexican millers expected, leading them to buy less wheat from the U.S.  
  Some of the efforts being made by members of the U.S. wheat industry to better satisfy 
the Mexican milling market, include giving information related with U.S. wheat quality.  In this 
study we demonstrated that this information did not increase Mexican demand for U.S. wheat.  
With this we do not imply that information will consistently have a negative impact on U.S. 
exports to Mexico, as this might be the case for only the 2004-2007 period, and for the   15 
variability in U.S. quality with respect to Canada.  This result contrasts some anecdotal evidence 
suggesting that the availability of quality information in recent years has led Mexican buyers to 
pursue wheat procurement via rail direct shipments from geographic regions where the published 
quality information annually shows a close match to their milling needs. 
  On either case, it has been demonstrated that Mexican millers are better off having 
extended wheat quality information, as welfare losses due to possible changes in quality are 
greater when millers do not have the information rather than when they actually do.  Despite the 
limitations of this study as the limited time period of operations of PGI, our findings prove that 
wheat quality information does represent a value to foreign U.S. wheat buyers.    16 
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Table 1.  Price Elasticity Estimates  
 
Price Elasticity  Country 
U.S.  Canada  Mexico 
U.S.  1.104  0.922  0.182 
Canada  1.913  -1.711  -0.203 
Mexico  0.596  -0.319  -0.276 20 
Table 2.  Cost for Different Average Price Inputs and Average Marketing 
Expenditures before and after PGI Began Operations, Holding Output Production 
Constant 
Variable  Cost 
After PGI began reporting quality, holding 
prices constant  $208,139.680 
   
Before PGI began its quality reporting 
program  $215,057.130 
   
After PGI began reporting quality, allowing 
prices to fluctuate  $240,179.550 
 21 
Table 3.  Compensating Variation, Compensating Surplus, Cost of Ignorance Values 
 
Welfare Measure  Values 
CV  -$6,914.450 
   
CS  -$67,707.790 
   
Cost of Ignorance  -$60,790.340 
 
  
 
 